China seeks to counter India’s rise by deepening its influence in South Asia and binding Bangladesh through trade, infrastructure, and military ties. Interim leader Muhammad Yunus has pivoted Dhaka toward Beijing with major investments, including control of Mongla Port. This shift threatens Indian security and demands urgent diplomatic recalibration.
China has long aimed to be the top dog in Asia. Historically, the Chinese have called their state Zhōngguó, which literally means the Middle Kingdom. For centuries, China was the dominant global economy and the most powerful empire in the world. Beijing sees itself as reclaiming its rightful position in the world after the century of humiliation that began with the First Opium War (1839–1842) and ended with the defeat of Japan in World War II (1945).
The US-China Economic and Security Review Commission tells us that China’s strategy in South Asia is to check the rise of India. To do so, Beijing is exploiting the India-Pakistan rivalry. It is also cultivating influence among other South Asian countries: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, the Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. The China-Pakistan relationship is well known. Not so well-known is the fact that China has deepened its relationship with Bangladesh. Beijing has entwined itself deeply into Bangladesh’s economy, infrastructure, digital systems, and security matrix.
The Courting of Dhaka: How the Dragon Slipped In
Bangladesh was born in 1971 thanks to India’s going to war against Pakistan. Thanks to its role in liberating Bangladesh, India earned much goodwill in the young nation on the Bay of Bengal. Relations between the two countries remained close for decades.
Warning signs for the India-Bangladesh relationship appeared as early as 2004. That year, China replaced India as Bangladesh’s “top source of imports.” Bangladesh has given China special economic zones, such as one in the strategic port city of Chittagong and the other in the national capital of Dhaka. China has also invested and continues to invest in roads, bridges, power plants, and ports. Bangladesh became the first country in South Asia to join China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
In 2016, Chinese President Xi Jinping visited Dhaka, and the two countries upgraded the China-Bangladesh relationship to “a strategic cooperative partnership.” China has a near-monopoly in high-tech construction and a key presence in key transportation corridors.
Early this year, Bangladesh made a major foreign policy shift. Under Sheikh Hasina, the previous leader ousted by street protests in July-August 2024, Bangladesh walked the diplomatic tightrope, balancing India and China. China became Bangladesh’s top trading partner and top supplier of military hardware during the last ten years of Hasina’s rule, yet she kept India onside due to her party’s historic links with India.
Since Hasina was ousted, relations between Bangladesh and India have steadily and dramatically deteriorated. Historically, every new Bangladeshi leader made India the first foreign destination. Muhammad Yunus, Chief Adviser of the interim government, broke with tradition and made his first state visit to Beijing, not Delhi. Bangladesh has now very publicly made a “pivot toward China.”
Closer Bangladesh-China Relations Threaten India
The March 2025 Yunus Beijing visit has led to increased Chinese investments in Bangladesh, securing $2.1 billion in investments, loans, and grants.
- Mongla Port: China will invest $400 million to modernize Mongla Port, Bangladesh’s second-largest seaport. This is a crucial strategic shift, as India had secured operating rights to a terminal at Mongla just before the Hasina government fell.
- “String of Pearls” Strategy: Chinese investment in Mongla raises Indian concerns because it is part of Beijing’s “String of Pearls” strategy—a chain of commercial ports across the Indian Ocean (including Gwadar, Colombo, and Hambantota) that could potentially be used by the Chinese navy as naval bases or logistical hubs to “contain India” in its own backyard.
- Teesta River Project: China will help Bangladesh in the Teesta River Comprehensive Management and Restoration Project. This alarms India because the Teesta River, originating in Sikkim, is at the center of a long-running water dispute between India and Bangladesh.
- The “Chicken’s Neck” Threat: India’s security is acutely threatened near the “Chicken’s Neck” (Siliguri Corridor), the narrow 20–22 kilometer stretch of land connecting India’s Northeast to the rest of the country. Reports that China plans to construct an airfield in Bangladesh’s Lalmonirhat district close to the Indian border are a major concern.
- Economic Gateway: Yunus mused that Bangladesh could serve as “an extension of the Chinese economy” and the sole oceanic gateway for India’s landlocked Seven Sisters.
- Taiwan Alignment: The supposedly democratic Bangladeshi government now explicitly opposes Taiwan’s independence, fully aligning its geopolitical stance with China.
China’s Growing Digital Footprint and Rising PLA Presence
- Digital Penetration: China dominates Bangladesh’s 4G infrastructure and is building 5G (with Huawei). Chinese-powered surveillance systems, smart city components, data storage centers, and facial recognition systems are embedded in Bangladesh’s civic and policing infrastructure. This growing digital dependency is a major strategic worry for India, as data collected could be vulnerable to siphoning by the Chinese state.
- Military Dependency: Bangladesh is the second-largest importer of Chinese kits after Pakistan. China provided 73.6% of Bangladesh’s arms acquisitions between 2010 and 2020. This includes tanks, artillery, naval vessels (like the two Type 035G Ming-class submarines acquired in 2016), and air defense platforms.
- PLA Training: Increasingly, China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) trains Bangladeshi military officers. The PLA has now replaced India as a key partner, with the Bangladeshi National Defense College hosting PLA instructors.
Rising India-Bangladesh Trust Deficit and Why Delhi Needs to Act Now
A trust deficit has developed between Delhi and Dhaka. Even under Hasina, China’s presence was growing (700 Chinese companies operated in Bangladesh by 2003), fueling disquiet after the 2020 India-China border clash.
- Immigration Issues: The Indian government’s attempts to institute a National Register of Citizens (NRC) and the introduction of the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) in 2019 are emotive issues that worry Bangladeshis. They fear both acts could cause an influx of Muslim immigrants to Bangladesh and damage trade.
- Rise of Islamists: With Hasina’s fall, the influence of the Islamist party Jamaat-e-Islami has risen. This party opposed Bangladeshi independence in 1971 and its leaders, who want closer ties with Pakistan and Turkey, now regularly confer with the caretaker Yunus government. This shifts Bangladesh’s political center of gravity away from India.
- Hasina’s Refuge: India’s decision to give refuge to former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina sits poorly with Bangladesh’s new regime.
The authors believe all is not lost yet. Many Bangladeshis still value a close relationship with India due to shared history and strong trade ties ($15.9 billion in 2023). India must recognize the urgency and counter China’s moves by engaging with Bangladeshi civil society and youth (over 40% of the population is under 25). A renewed emphasis on connectivity, cultural ties, educational exchanges, and digital collaboration could potentially offset Beijing’s checkbook diplomacy.
Muddled thinking, lack of focus, and inaction imperil long-term Indian interests. Delhi needs to engage the new Bangladeshi regime with a judicious mix of accommodation and assertion; otherwise, it may lose its leverage in Dhaka permanently.
